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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court Of Appeals has appellate jurisdication in this matter in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(h), (1953 as amended). 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether the lower court properly set aside for lack of consideration a provision of a 
divorce decree when Appellee willfully bargained for the provision while represented by counsel, 
and in consideration of the bargained for provision, Appellant agreed to forbear the assertion of 
various claims in order satisfy Appellee's desire to quickly settle the matter. 
Standard of Review 
The Court may reverse the lower court's decision to set aside the decree under Utah 
R.Civ.P §60(b) when an abuse of discretion is shown. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 123 Utah 
416, 419-20, 260 P.2d 741, 742-43 (1953). 
STATEMENT Of THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant and Appellee were married in 1988. In 1995, the parties agreed to terms of 
divorce, and entered those terms in a stipulation to the court. In one of the terms so entered, 
Appellee agreed to relinquish her rights in Appellant's military retirement benefits. In 
consideration for doing so, Appellant forbore the assertion of various claims in order to satisfy 
Appellee's desire to quickly settle the case. Following the divorce, Appellee sought to have the 
divorce decree set aside. 
The Decision Below 
1 
The court below upheld the validity of the divorce decree generally, but set aside the 
provision relating to the military retirement benefits. With regards to that provision, the trial 
judge ruled that Appellee's agreement to relinquish her rights was unsupported by consideration, 
and therefore unenforceable. Appellant now appeals the lower court's decision and asks that the 
provision relating to the military retirement benefits be reinstated. 
Facts 
Appellant and Appellee were married on November 4, 1988 in Badenbausen, Germany. 
At the time of the parties' marriage, Appellee was living in Germany and Appellant was enlisted in 
the United States Army. 
In 1994, Appellant had the opportunity to attend training to become an officer in the 
United States Army. While Appellee was aware that attending officer cadet school would require 
Appellant to be separated from his family for eight months, Appellee agreed with Appellant that 
completion of the training would be in the best interests of their family. 
On September 24, 1994, Appellant left for Ft. Benning, Georgia. While he was away, he 
sent Appellee more than $25,000. In addition. Appellee worked full time throughout Appellant's 
absence, and had sole discretion over her own income. She did not save anything that Appellant 
sent her. 
During Appellant's absence, Appellee developed a romantic relationship with an individual 
named Robert Childs, and in April of 1995, two months prior to Appellant's return, Appellee 
informed Appellant that she wanted a divorce. By the time Appellant returned in June, Appellee 
had retained the services of Utah attorney, Steven Russell, and had prepared a stipulation upon 
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which she wished to base a divorce. Unable to agree on the terms of divorce demanded by 
Appellee, Appellant subsequently filed for divorce himself 
Ms. Susan Bradford of the guardian ad litem's office was appointed by the court to 
represent the parties' minor children in the matter and in August of 1995, Ms. Bradford, Mr. 
Schollian, Appellant, Appellee and Mr. Russell attended a mediation conference for the purpose 
of working out a settlement agreement on the matter. See Exhibit A, a true and accurate copy of 
a statement made by Ms. Bradford, dated August 25, 1995, attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. After three hours, the parties finally agreed upon the terms of divorce 
which were reflected in the parties' stipulation. 
In paragraph 11 of the decree of the lower court, Appellee relinquished the rights she had 
in Appellant's military retirement benefits. Prior to the relinquishment, Appellee was only entitled 
to an equitable division of the present value of the right to receive future payments (to start upon 
Appellant's retirement) that accrued during the seven years of the parties' marriage. Anxiously 
wanting to expedite the divorce, Appellee agreed not to pursue her small share of Appellant's 
military pension in consideration for his promise not to assert claims of greater visitation rights, 
his relinquishment of claims he had arising out of the $25,000 he sent to her during his absence, 
and his agreement to settle the matter quickly. Appellee's own attorney stipulated in an affidavit 
that he had informed Appellee of her rights to Appellant's military retirement, but she was more 
concerned about settling the matter quickly. See Exhibit B, a true and accurate copy of Mr. 
Russell's affidavit, dated February 15, 1996, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
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Following the entry of the divorce decree, Appellee retained new counsel and sought to 
have the decree set aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure claiming mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The law does not support the lower court's decision to set aside the provision in the 
divorce decree relating to the military retirement benefits. Section 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure allows a court to set aside a decree when there were situations "which 
prevented] the presentation of a claim or defense." Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 123 Utah 416, 
417, 260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953). However, "equity is not available to reinstate rights and 
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain made." 
Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980). Appellee had a full and fair opportunity with 
counsel to present her claims and defenses, but sought to set aside the decree because she came to 
regret the bargain she made. Because she did have such an opportunity, the court below abused 
his discretion in setting aside the military retirement benefits provision. 
Even if the lower court did not abuse its discretion by setting the provision aside when 
Appellee had a fair opportunity to present her case, the lower court did abuse its discretion in 
ruling that Appellee's agreement to relinquish her rights in Appellant's military retirement benefits 
was unsupported by consideration. Appellant forbore the assertion of various claims in 
consideration of Appellee's relinquishment in order to satisfy her desire to settle the matter 
quickly. 
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ARGUMENT 
L The lowei com t abused its discretion in setting aside the military retirement 
benefits provision since Appellee had a full and fair opportunity with counsel to 
present her claims and defenses. 
The power to set aside: a deci ee is an equitable remecu ...... "*e 
harshness of enforcine e cm which may occur through " 
presentation of a claim or c - — " Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953). 
] • vcnerifip^ ; > 
relieved, "amo 3ke, inadvt :s ^e. or excuse *ct' IsL 
Despite me „. . _ 
discretion in granting ,v den>.«0 I&. Whi, ^ourt is anxious to protect the losing 
party who has not had the opportunity to present ^ .1 u . ...a. e 
the effects of res judicata and create a hardship to the successful litigant : dt 743. Therefore, 
the court may not grant relief unless the movant shows "that [si e diligence and that 
| a i lnT ' i ilV"( I \S fill ml 
[she] had no control." I d 
In the case at oa., A r ounsel ana nau a iuii aiiu i a11 111 mi 1 1 1 mi 11 m , mi 
present her case. Bc«
 2 - i a mediation conference, with counsel, and over the course 
of three hours hammered out t *vorce agreement I in :: • i dei to avoid this 
inevitable fact, A ppellee has claimed that hei attoi ney did not notify her properly of her rights to 
Appellant's military retirement benefits, which failure prevented her fro- its. This 
I I! ii III III III III III I i I III I i l l I l l Il III I1 I l l l l l lWn Hi I Ill IJl lSSfl l lU'l i l l ln i l i t > IIII « i n n l , ' im.i i n i l d 
that he fully infbra _ III i m njhts c tto a port* I [ "If if i I  I  mint's] militai } fi s nsion, but she w a s 
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more interested in settling the matter." See Exhibit B at paragraph 7. Even if her version of the 
events is correct, "equitable relief will not be granted to a party . . . on the sole ground that the 
negligence of the attorney . . . prevented a fair trial." This principle holds true even when the 
judgment is erroneous or inequitable. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 260 P.2d at 743. 
Regardless of whether the Court accepts Appellee's or Mr. Russell's version of the facts, 
Appellee had a fiill and fair opportunity to present her claims within the meaning of Utah law. 
She has not met the burden of showing "that [she] was prevented from appearing by 
circumstances over which [she] had no control." IdL With regards to the military retirement 
benefits, the only argument she offers to this effect is that the negligence of her attorney prevented 
her from asserting her claim. She has not asserted fraud or any other intervening cause. As has 
already been demonstrated, Utah law does not allow an attorney's negligence to operate as the 
sole basis for the relief she seeks. 
In essence, Appellee made a bargain and later regretted it. "Equity is not available to 
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret 
the bargain made." Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980). 
Since Appellee failed to meet the burden necessary for the relief she was seeking, the court 
below abused its discretion in setting aside the military retirement benefits provision. 
IL Appellant gave valuable consideration for Appellee's agreement to relinquish her 
right? in Appellant's military retirement benefits by agreeing to forbear the 
assertion of various claims which would have delayed finalization of the divorce 
proceedings contrary to Appellee's wishes. 
The court below ruled that Appellee's agreement to relinquish her rights in Appellant's 
military retirement benefits was unenforceable for lack of consideration. In so ruling, however, 
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the lower court ignored Appellant's agreement to forbear the assertion of certain claims. 
interest in seeing the .c*: ;raph~ t originally 
insisted on ten * ^ . . ... _., „i.u.. : ^ LIIC:. . 
Appellant was further interested in piessa ° »sainst Appe^e with n^ '*TrUir- rht $25,000 
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party believes that the claim may be fairly determined to be valid " The child custody claim 
faith, believing them to be valid Therefore, their surrender constiti e consideration for 
Appellee' s relinquisni... 
If the Court were to judge the sufficiency of the consideration in this case it would find 
Appellant's consit n , , a t e Appellee' slight s 1: : h i i h isl: a in i sn lilitai > retirement 
benefits were limited to one-uau ui mc amount atti ibutable to the pei«. s 
employment which coincided with his marriage to Appellee. Woodward ._ >±jjv&mx±A9 656 P.2d 
I | "i n li-ili |M!»K ' II ' * " t r i e d fr ' — 
disj ome as divisible
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authorized deductions" which include, among other things, amounts properly deducted for 
federal, state and local taxes; amounts owed by the military member to the United States; and 
amounts deducted to pay government life insurance. Maxwell v. Maxwell. 796 P.2d 403, 405 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1990). Finally, the value of Appellee's rights was the present value of the right to 
receive such payments upon Appellant's military retirement to occur years in the future. Given 
these limitations, it is clear that the value of Appellee's rights was slight at best, and that 
Appellant's surrender of claims was adequate consideration for the relinquishment of her rights. 
HL The Court should reverse the decision below since the divorce decree did not 
"completely thwart or distort the processes of justice," 
In the proceedings below, Appellee cited Boyce v. Boyce. 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980) to 
support her motion to set aside the divorce decree. Appellee specifically used the following quote 
from Boyce to support her argument: "A liberal standard for application of Rule 60(b) in divorce 
cases is justified by the doctrine of continuing jurisdiction that a divorce court has over its 
decrees." Li at 931. 
The above stated quote was taken out of context by Appellee and does not support the 
conclusion that setting aside the decree was justified in this matter. The paragraph immediately 
preceding the quote stated that relief should be granted "when it appears that the processes of 
justice have been so completely thwarted or distorted as to persuade the court that in fairness and 
good conscience the judgment should not be permitted to stand." IdL at 931, citing Haner v. 
Haner, Utah 2d 290, 301, 373 P.2d 577, 578 (1962). 
Given Appellee's opportunity to present her claims with counsel, the fact that no 
allegations of fraud have been made, and the de minimus value of Appellee's right in the military 
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retirement benefits,' * es not seem that the "processes of justice have been so completely 
thwai ln f 1 ii1, 1 |ii I'll ill, mi 111 f i l l llllliii1 ii" 
CONCLUSION 
I 'oi all the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold that Appellee s agreement to 
relinquish her rights in Appellant's military retirement benefits was supported by valuable 
consideration and is enfc i :> 2 able, 
RESPECTFUI I -\ SUBMITTED on '•• - i ^ dav <>r \nril 1998,, 
V v
- W ^ ^ 
Jerry Skmbllian 
Aftoniey ror Appellant 
^&pt LcSU QJy o r ^.JoL 
r 
ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure §60(b) 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action 
has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
3. Exhibit A, Statement of Susan Bradford, dated August 25, 1995 
4. Exhibit B, Affidavit of Steven Russell, dated February 15, 1996 
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KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
DENNIS EARL WHEELER, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Case No. 954902697 DA 
DIANE DAWN WHEELER, 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendant. Coram. Lisa A. Jones 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for 
hearing before the above-entitled court on March 18, 1997, at the 
hour of 9s00 a.m., the Honorable William B. Bohling, Third Judicial 
District Court Judge, presiding, on Defendant's Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate 
and Set Aside Decree of Divorce and Stipulation and Motion for 
Relief from Judgement, and Plaintiff not being present in person, 
but being represented by counsel, Jerry Schollian, and Defendant 
being present in person and being represented by counsel, Kellie F. 
and the court having reviewed the court file, including Defendant's 
motion to set aside Decree, Plaintiff's response, Affidavit of 
Steven Russell, and the commissioner's recommendation and resulting 
order, and having heard the proffers and arguments of counsel, and 
based thereon, the court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on November 4, 1988 
and divorced by this court -on December 7, 1995. 
2. During the course of the parties' marriage, Plaintiff was 
employed in the United States Armed Forces. Defendant was a 
homemaker and accrued no retirement during the marriage. The 
parties had two children. 
3. The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were entered by this court on December 7, 1995, 
which Decree, among other things, awarded Plaintiff all right, 
title and interest in his military retirement and did not award 
Defendant her marital share. 
4. At the time of the parties' divorce, the parties did not 
own any real property. 
5. At the time of the parties' divorce, Defendant was 
awarded a very minimal alimony award and ordered to pay one-half of 
the costs of transportation for purposes of Plaintiff exercising 
visitation with the minor children. Further, within the Decree of 
Divorce, in lieu of any claim that Plaintiff had on the parties' 
household furnishings and other jointly owned property, Defendant 
agreed to pay her own attorney's fees. There was no other 
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substantial property and within the Decree, it was found that all 
personal property accumulated by the parties had been divided. 
6. Subsequent to the entry of the Decree, Defendant sought 
new counsel and on or about January 19^ 1996, Defendant timely 
filed a 60(b) motion for relief from judgment and to set aside the 
Decree. Within that motion and an accompanying affidavit, 
Defendant stated under oath that she was never informed by her 
prior counsel of any rights to Plaintiff's retirement and that she 
was informed "you will never get it." 
7. Under 10 U.S.C. §1406(d)(2), a spouse or former spouse 
cannot be paid their retirement directly from the military fund and 
the retainer pay of the member unless they have been married for 
ten years during which there was ten years of service creditable to 
the member's retired pay. However, every state that has addressed 
the issue of a possible ten-year limitation on the award of the 
military retirement by the state court has rejected such an 
interpretation, holding that the ten-year provision in the U.S. 
Code applies only to situations in which direct payments are to be 
made by the secretary of a particular branch of the service to the 
non-military spouse. See, Marriage of Wood and Wood, 676 P.2d 338 
(Or. App. 1984); Oxelaren v. Oxelaren, 670 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App. 2 
Dist. 1984); Konzen v. Konzen, 693 P.2d 97 (Wash. 1985); Levine v. 
Spickelmier, 707 P.2d 452 (Idaho 1985); Pacheco v. Ouintana, 730 
3 
P.2d 1 (N.W. App. 1985); Beltran v. Beltran. 227 Cal Rptr. 924 
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1986); Butcher v. Butcher, 375 W.E.2d 226 (W. 
Va. 1987); Stone v. Stone, 725 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. App. 1987); Scott v. 
Scott, 519 So.2d 351 (La. App. 2 Dir. 1988); Parker v. Parker, 750 
P.2d 1313 (Wy. 1988); Carranza v. Carranza, 765 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. App. 
1989); Warren v. Warren, 563 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. App. 2 Dist. 1990); 
DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So.2d 956 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1991) ; King 
v. King, 605 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 1992). 
8. In the state of Utah, Defendant is entitled to an 
equitable interest in Plaintiff's military pension. Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
9. It is clear from the face of the Findings and Decree that 
Defendant did not "trade" her interest in Plaintiff's retirement 
for any other marital asset. The marital assets of the parties 
were limited and the retirement appears to be the only substantial 
asset acquired by the parties during the marriage. 
10. Defendant had a clear right to a portion of Plaintiff's 
retirement. 
11. Defendant relinquished her right to Plaintiff's 
retirement for no return. There was no "benefit of the bargain." 
12. The affidavit of Defendant indicates to the court that 
there was clearly not an understanding by Defendant of her rights 
to Plaintiff's retirement and that her agreement to the award of 
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military retirement in full to Plaintiff constitutes mistake and 
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now maices 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff and Defendant 
in this action and over the subject matter of this action* 
2. Defendant promptly and timely filed a motion pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, as to the 
military retirement/ Defendant's motion should be granted• 
3. No other terms or conditions contained within the 
parties' Decree of Divorce should be set aside. 
DATED this day of , 199 • 
BY THE COURT 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge 
Approved: 
JERRY SCHOLLIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED: 
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Wheeler. Devin Martin (12/5/88) and Valerie Nicole (6/16/90) 954903543 
8/25/95 (SCB) We had a conference w the parties and their counsel to discuss the Issue* 
ot day care and vi&i&idiion and trying and resolve this casp in its entirety. The parties 
agree that F will be provided w a day care schedule on the children on a monthly basis 
w/in ten days of the end of each month. Also, M would send her monthly work 
schedule as to times and dates worked and have it initialed by her supervisor. That, too, 
w/in ten days. Upon receipt of this documentation F will pay-w/m five days of receipt 
of the documentation but no later than the 1 5th of the next month, one-half of ail 
outstanding day care. If F does not receive the documentation then he will not be 
required to pay. The regular mode of sending this information will be by mail although 
fax is acceptable. 
On the ib^ue of telephone contact, every Wednesday Dennis will call M's home and 
Devon is to answer the phone or Valerie and that is at 7:00 and he may speak to them 
as long as he desires. Every Sunday morning at 10:00 Diane will call Dennis and make 
the children available for that phone call. The children will be allowed the telephone at 
any other times they so desire. The F should be sent the holiday papers the children 
make on the holidays that he is going to be celebrating w him and any other school 
papers and school records he should have access to as well as having his name put on 
the school records to send him information. He is to get a calendar before the school 
year starts so he knows their vacations. 
On odd numbered years F will gpt the entire childrens' Christmas vacation and spring 
break (at least seven days). On even numbered years F shail have seven days around 
Thanksgiving even if it doe* take the children out of school. His visitation is more 
important. He will also get the seven day break at spring. In the summer of 1996 he 
will get six uninterrupted weeks and in 1997 he will gel eight uninterrupted weeks. 
There will bo telephone contact between the children and M during his visitation and he 
will inform her of their whereabouts and any trips or vacations so she can have 
telephone contaa d* designated. Also should he com* info town he needs to provide 48 
hour notice so he can take the children on those designated times so as not to interfere 
w their schooling. He certainly can keep them while he is in town for those short stays. 
Jerry Schollian (6326), of 
NEELEMAN & STEPHENS, L.C. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tel: (801)-596-9400 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
DENNIS EARL WHEELER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIANA DAWN WHEELER 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN RUSSELL 
Civil No. 954902697DA 
Judge William H. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I, Steve Russell, being first duly sworn, do hereby depose and state, 
1. I am of the age of majority and do possess the capacity and personal knowledge to 
attest to the facts stated herein. 
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah. 
3. Until January 8, 1996,1 represented the defendant in this matter. 
4. On or about August 10,1995,1 met with the defendant,jstawoy Bradford of the 
guardian ad litem, the plaintiff and his attorney at the office of the guardian at litem for the purpose of 
mediating a settlement in this matter, (hereinafter "settlement conference"). 
5. During the settlement conference, I clearly explained to the defendant the difference 
between sole custody and joint custody. The defendant agreed along with the guardian ad litem, the 
defendant and his attorney that joint physical custody of the minor children would be in the best 
interests of the minor children. 
6. During the settlement conference, the defendant readily agreed that it was in the best 
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interests of the minor children that the plaintiff have extended periods of visitation to begin in 1996 
with six (6) weeks during the summer and eight (8) weeks for every year thereafter. The plaintiff 
insisted on ten (10) weeks of visitation but compromised to eight (8) weeks in consideration of 
settling the matter and not going to trial. The parties agreed that it was in the best interests of the 
minor children to visit the plaintiff for only six (6) during the summer of 1996 due to their young age. 
7. During the settlement conference, the defendant agreed not to pursue her share of 
the plaintiffs military pension in consideration of settling the matter and not going to trial. During the 
settlement conference, I fully informed the defendant that she had a right to a portion of the plaintiffs 
pension, but she was more interested in settling the matter. 
8. During the settlement conference, the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney stated that 
the defendant should pay for 1/2 of the costs of transporting the children to and from his residence 
during his periods of visitation. The defendant readily agreed to this term. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this / S l i a v of February 996. 
r ^<^&^&~^~ « 
Steve Russell 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me on this day of February, 1996. 
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